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Chinese Policies in Tibet: Should  
India Remain Concerned?
Michael C. Davis†
India has long been engaged with the Tibet issue, though in recent years this 
engagement tends to focus more on strategic considerations, as some critics question 
the costs, in terms of Sino-Indian relations, of hosting Tibetan exiles. These costs are 
said to arise out of tense relations over border disputes, security concerns and trade. 
These strategic considerations may tend to drown out evaluation of the substantive 
situation that has produced the Sino-Tibetan impasse—which is the focus of this 
article. With its long relationship with Tibet, India can ill afford to ignore deep-seated 
social justice problems in the community that stretches along most of its northern 
border, especially if Chinese policies in Tibet are likely to increase or decrease refugee 
flows. This article offers an overview of the Sino-Tibetan dispute and efforts at 
resolution. After the March 2008 uprising, in a Chinese effort at damage control in 
the lead up to the Olympics, three quick Sino-Tibetan meetings took place, in May, 
July and October. In the October meeting the Tibetans produced a “Memorandum 
on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” which the Chinese side quickly 
rejected. In a November plenary meeting of representatives of the worldwide Tibetan 
exile community, which took place in Dharamsala, India, Tibetans resolved to push 
on with their efforts to achieve autonomy. With China knocking at the door, these 
developments will continue to demonstrate the importance of India’s fundamental 
commitments to the Tibetan people.
IntroductIon
Public debate in India has frequently been engaged with the question of  Tibet. This is not surprising, as Tibet has for centuries been India’s 
northern neighbour. More importantly, Tibetan culture has been deeply 
influenced by India, resulting in a deep and abiding relationship between the 
Tibetan and Indian peoples, which includes shared religious values. Tibet 
occupies much of  India’s northern border and for centuries served as a buffer 
between India and China. With China’s occupation of  Tibet since the early 
1950s, China became India’s immediate neighbour, initiating a sometimes-
troubled political relationship between the two nations. China’s intrusive 
territorial claims beyond the border into largely Tibetan areas in the North of  
India have been a frequent source of  conflict. Other disputes have also plagued 
the Sino-Indian relationship, ranging from China’s alignment with Pakistan 
and global strategic alignments, to the vital issue of  water. The presence of  
over 120,000 Tibetan refugees in India has surely intensified Indian interest in 
the Tibetan issue. This includes important moral concerns due to India’s long-
term commitments to Tibetan refugees and due to concerns democratic India 
may have about the policies authoritarian China pursues across the border, 
aggravating the refugee problem.
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At the same time, China growing strength and assertiveness have produced 
strategic challenges for India that may often drown out the deeper moral 
commitments, as India seeks to maintain friendly relations with China, its 
largest trading partner. Critics of  India’s Tibet policies have pointed to the 
resultant costs in Sino-Indian relations, which they associate with India’s 
hosting of  the Dalai Lama and his fellow exiles.1 Such critics indentify a 
number of  critical issues on the Sino-Indian agenda which are impacted by the 
Indian stance on Tibet, including concerns that China may align itself  more 
closely with Pakistan, encouraging a belligerent attitude over common border 
disputes; Chinese intrusion into the Indian Ocean; concerns about placing at 
risk trade with one of  India’s largest trading partners; and concerns about 
critical Chinese support on issues such as climate change or a greater role for 
India in the UN Security Council.2 
The present article focuses on Chinese policies in Tibet. It is the substance of  
such policies in Tibet that must ultimately drive long-term Indian commitments 
to Tibetan refugees, though the author feels compelled, as preliminary matter, 
to express skepticism about the claim that abandoning Tibetan refugees 
will offer strategic benefits to India vis-à-vis its relationship with China. 
Instead, the author argues, a more forceful and principled Indian policy that 
encourages solutions aimed at the source of  this problem in Tibet may be 
more fruitful.  In fact, a case may be made that a surrender of  its principled 
stance on Tibet would cast India in a much weaker role and embolden China. 
As the two largest countries on earth in the same region, there is an inherent 
competitiveness in the Sino-Indian relationship. Over the past decades, even 
during relatively peaceful periods, China has showed little inclination to 
abandon its claims on Indian territory. The drying up of  the North China 
plain and the consequent need to find new sources of  water offer little hope 
that it will spare the Himalayan region from dam projects. China’s insatiable 
thirst for energy resources offers little hope it will tone down its support of  
Pakistan. Further, the trade relationship between India and China appears 
to be one that has been unbalanced and unfavourable to India. Thus, since 
China has long pursued a hard realist perspective in international relations, the 
1. M. D. Nalapat, Tibet’s Shadow Over India, China, Russia, PakIstan oBserVer, Oct. 10, 
2009, available at http://www.uyghurnews.com/tibetan/Read.asp?TibetNews=tibets-
shadow-over-india-china-russia-meet&ItemID=OX-1172009255055200283210; Phunchok 
Stobdan, An Indian View of the Tibetan Situation,  asIa-PacIFIc BulletIn, Mar. 20, 2009, 
available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb031.pdf; Srinath 
Raghavan, Hindi-Chini Ties Rest on Our Tibet Stand, asIan aGe, Apr. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/opinion/opinion/hindi-chini-ties-
rest-on-our-tibet-stand.aspx.
2. See China’s ‘intentions’ Closely Monitored: India, hIndustan tImes, Aug. 31, 2010, available 
at http://www.hindustantimes.com/China-s-intentions-being-closely-monitored-India/
H1-Article1-594233.aspx; Beijing is using Pakistan to slow India’s rise as a great power, 
IndIan exPress, Nov. 4, 2010, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/beijing-is-
using-pakistan-to-slow-indias-rise-as-great-power/706987/0.
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likelihood, from a strategic perspective, is that India surrendering its principles 
on Tibet will simply be viewed as a sign of  weakness and embolden China 
in regard to these other vital concerns. In this sense, India’s commitment to 
Tibetan exiles is both morally correct and strategically practical. 
For the reasons indicated above, the present article will set aside these 
strategic considerations—which in any event, seem unlikely to be adequately 
addressed by some simple formula concerning Tibet—and consider the merits 
of  Tibetan concerns in respect of  China’s policies. The author feels that this 
is the more practical route, as it directs India’s considerations to the merits of  
its on-going offer of  sanctuary to Tibetan refugees and encourages a foreign 
policy consistent with the long-held democratic and human rights principles 
of  India. The above strategic considerations have all too often drowned out 
Indian considerations of  the underlying merits of  the Sino-Tibetan impasse. 
Are there ways for China to improve its Tibet policies to remove this obstacle 
from the strategic landscape? For India, there may also be lessons to be learned 
for a more constructive role in moving forward and concerning India’s own 
border communities. 
The present analysis will consider, in the following order: the events of  
2008 which led to the present crisis, the substance of  China’s policies in recent 
years concerning Tibetan autonomy, international principles that may assist 
resolution, and domestic constitutional possibilities which may suggest a way 
forward to achieve a more genuine autonomy for the Tibetan region. The 
author will argue that China’s current policies fail to live up to international 
standards and that the Chinese Constitution offers tools for a more constructive 
policy. Foreign governments, including India, may find it more constructive to 
encourage Chinese policy reform in this regard. 
I. the 2008 tIbetan rIots and demonstratIons 
and the sIno-tIbetan Impasse.
The March 2008 Tibetan riots and the subsequent Chinese crackdown 
raised considerable international concern about Chinese policies and human 
rights practices in Tibet. While Chinese officials were angered by the riots 
in Tibet and by the international protests that followed the Olympic torch—
including protest in India—they faced considerable international pressure to 
meet with the Dalai Lama and resolve this long-standing dispute.3 With the 
2008 Beijing Olympics approaching, China immediately moved into damage 
control mode, including pressuring countries such as India in regard to the safe 
passage of  the Olympic torch. To placate international concern, they quickly 
held an informal meeting with Dalai Lama’s representatives in Shenzhen near 
3. Willy Lam, Beijing’s Post-Olympics Shakedown in Xinjiang and Tibet, chIna BrIeF, Sept. 3, 
2008, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_
news]=5132&tx_ttnews[backPid]=168&no_cache=1. 
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Hong Kong in May 2008 and scheduled the seventh and eighth rounds in their 
ongoing formal dialogue for July and October 2008.4  The Chinese indifference 
to Tibetan concerns that was on display in these meetings certainly calls into 
question the Chinese capacity to bring closure to this issue.
In these meetings, the Chinese side showed no interest in discussing 
substantive concerns. They merely reiterated their long-standing position that 
the “contacts and dialogues were about the Dalai Lama’s personal future, 
and not so-called “China-Tibet negotiation” or “dialogue between Han and 
Tibetan people”.5 They insisted on three “stops” and four “non-supports”. 
The Dalai Lama’s representatives were told to “stop activities aimed at splitting 
China, stop plotting and inciting violence and stop disrupting and sabotaging 
the Beijing Olympic Games.” Later this was refined to include “four non-
supports”: “not to support activities to disturb the upcoming Beijing Olympic 
Games, not to support plots to fan violent criminal activities, not to support and 
concretely curb the violent terrorist activities of  the “Tibetan Youth Congress” 
and not to support any argument and activity to seek “Tibet independence” 
and split the region from the country.”6 The Tibetan side had long met all these 
conditions, though they would surely contest Chinese accusations of  terrorist 
activities by the Tibetan Youth Congress based in Dharamsala, India. 
In a display of  disdain for the Tibetan cause, Chinese officials and supporting 
experts went so far as to challenge the Dalai Lama’s credentials to represent 
the Tibetan people, insisting that he must speak to the central government as 
a “common person.”7 Throughout the weeks and months following the March 
2008 riots and demonstrations, Chinese leaders launched vociferous personal 
attacks on the Dalai Lama, labeling him a “wolf  in monk’s robes” and lumping 
together all branches of  the exile Tibetan community as the “Dalai clique”.8 
However, these Chinese arguments generally met with skepticism across the 
globe.9 
In response to a Chinese request, at the July 2008 Sino-Tibetan meeting, 
the Tibetan exiles prepared a “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the 
Tibetan People” outlining their position for a way forward under the Chinese 
Constitution.10 The Tibetan Memorandum elaborates Tibetan “aspirations” 
4. Michael C. Davis, For Talks to Succeed, China Must Admit to a Tibet Problem, yale GloBal, 
May 16, 2008, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/talks-succeed-china-must-admit-tibet-
problem, (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
5. Chinese Official Urges Dalai Lama to Respond with Sincerity After Recent Contact, 
chIna VIew, July 6, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/07/
content_8500898.htm.
6. Id.
7. China Unwilling to Broach Tibet with Dalai Lama, Indo-asIan news serVIce, July 15, 2008.
8. Michael C. Davis, supra note 4.
9. Michael C. Davis, Divergence Grows Between China and the West—Part II, yale GloBal, 
Dec. 23, 2010, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/divergence-grows-between-china-and-
west-–-part-ii, (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
10. Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.
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for autonomy in eleven policy areas, including language, culture, religion, 
education, environmental protection, utilization of  natural resources, economic 
development and trade, public health, public security, population migration 
and cultural, educational, and religious exchanges with other countries.11 
As discussed below, all of  these are covered by existing unfulfilled national 
ethnic autonomy policies enacted under Article 4 of  the PRC Constitution, 
except those relating to public security, immigration and external exchanges 
in the commercial and cultural areas, which appear instead to track the 
Article 31 “one country, two systems” Hong Kong formula of  local control. 
Similar to Hong Kong, their proposal includes a specification that local laws 
within the scope of  autonomy not be subject to central approval as is now 
required in minority areas and that the terms of  their agreement with the 
Central Government not be subject to the Central Government’s unilateral 
amendment. They further proposed to unify into one the thirteen contiguous 
Tibetan areas that China has designated under its national autonomy laws. 
These proposals were presented as a starting position for further negotiation.12 
In response to the Tibetan Memorandum, the Chinese position hardened 
further. In early November 2008, in an extraordinary press conference hosted 
by the Chinese State Council, Mr. Zhu Weiqun of  the United Front Works 
Department issued a stinging attack on the Tibetan position.13 In the printed 
State Council Address that accompanied the press conference, the Tibetan 
request for “genuine autonomy” is treated as a request for  “a high degree 
of  autonomy,” as is promised to Hong Kong. In seeking such “high degree 
of  autonomy” the Tibetans are accused of  seeking “half-independence,” and 
“covert independence.”14 No explanation is given why the exact same language 
applied to Hong Kong means only autonomy. The State Council Address 
further accuses the exile Tibetans of  continuing to “collude with such dregs as 
‘democracy activists’, ‘falunkun (falungong) elements’ and ‘Eastern Turkistan 
terrorists’, though no evidence of  this is given.15 In seeking control over Chinese 
tibet.net/en/index.php?id=78&articletype=press&rmenuid=morepress&tab=2#TabbedPan
els1 (“Tibetan Memorandum”), (last visited Jan. 17, 2011); Summary of the Memorandum 
on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, Nov. 16, 2008, http://www.tibet.net/en/
index.php?id=77&articletype=press&rmenuid=morepress&tab=2#TabbedPanels1%3E (last 
visited Jan 17, 2011).
11. Tibetan Memorandum, supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. China says serious differences in talks with private envoys of the Dalai Lama, Permanent 
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Press Release), Nov. 9, 2010, http://
www.china-un.org/eng/gyzg/xizang/t521742.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (“State Council 
Address”).
 The press release quotes Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work 
Department of the CPC Central Committee, at the Press Conference by the State Council 
Office. The United Front Work Department has historically been responsible for national 
minority affairs.
14. Id.
15. Id. 
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migration into Tibet, the Dalai Lama is accused of  “ethnic cleansing.” The 
exile government is characterized as a “small group of  splittists.”16 
The State Council Address makes clear that the Chinese government had 
no intention of  discussing substantive issues. The meetings are said to be aimed 
at persuading the Dalai Lama to “give up his splitting activities”.17 The State 
Council Address declared, “[w]e never discussed the so-called ‘Tibet issue” 
and will “never make a concession.”18 In January 2009, China demonstrated 
even greater indifference and insensitivity to the Tibetan cause by creating 
a new holiday they have labeled “Serfs Emancipation Day,” to celebrate 
their “liberation” of  Tibet.19 Despite China’s dismissive attitude, a large mid-
November Tibetan exile meeting in Dharamsala, India decided to continue 
efforts at achieving genuine autonomy. They determined to suspend this 
fruitless series of  talks and find more effective nonviolent strategies to promote 
their cause.20 
Chinese anxieties over Tibetan intentions seem to block all efforts at finding 
a solution. At least rhetorically, the parties stated positions appear to reveal 
an overlapping consensus supporting autonomy under Chinese sovereignty.21 
The Chinese government has, however, offered no concessions regarding 
the character of  autonomy, claiming only that autonomy is provided under 
existing national minority laws22—which some would say is no autonomy at 
all. The Tibetan representatives in these discussions have conceded to Chinese 
demands regarding sovereignty, while insisting on what they call  “genuine 
autonomy” under a formula they have labeled the “middle way” approach.23 
16. Id.
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Tibet Sets ‘Serfs Emancipation Day,’ chIna daIly, Jan. 19, 2009, available at http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/19/content_7410293.htm..
20. China’s Communist Regime Losing Ground: Dalai Lama, tIBet sun, Jan. 17, 2008, 
available at http://www.tibetsun.com/archive/2009/01/17/chinas-communist-regime-
losing-ground-dalai-lama/. 
21. Warren Smith sees the two sides position as irreconcilable, as the central issue for Tibetans 
is the maintenance of Tibetan national identity and for the Chinese is to extinguish it. See 
generally warren w. smIth, chIna’s tIBet: autonomy or assImIlatIon 279 (2008).
22. Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet  (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 
May, 2004), available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040524/index.htm (“White 
Paper”).
23. The Dalai Lama began to articulate his “middle way” position in speeches in the 1980s 
before the US Congress and before the European Parliament. See Address to Members of 
the United States Congress: Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet (Sept. 21, 1987), http://www.
furhhdl.org/peace+plan (last visited Jan. 18, 2011); The Dalai Lama, Address to Members 
of the European Parliament (Jun. 15, 1988), http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/
strasbourg-proposal-1988 (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
 These original positions have been amended in response to Chinese requirements to make 
it clear that he is not seeking independence or imposing any conditions for discussions. See 
Autonomy and the Tibetan Perspective (Tibetan Parliamentary & Policy Research Centre, 
2005), http://www.tpprc.org/publication/autonomy_and_tibetan_perspective-2005.pdf 
(last visited Jan 18, 2011); The Middle-Way Approach, A Framework for Resolving the Issue 
of Tibet (Central Tibetan Administration, Dept. of Info. & Pub. Rel’ns, 2006), http://www.
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In asking for “genuine autonomy” the Tibetan exile leaders clearly appreciate 
the role of  political autonomy as an essential step for participation in cultural, 
social, economic and political life, promoting both democracy and human 
rights in Tibet.24 The sense of  urgency among Tibetans has increased in recent 
years along with fears that the 1.3 billion Chinese may eventually swamp the 
5.5 million Tibetans in the vast mountainous Tibetan region, leaving them 
a minority in their own land.25 There is fear it has already happened in the 
Tibetan cities. 26
II. chInese laws on natIonal mInorIty autonomy, as applIed to tIbet
China’s national minority autonomy policies are promulgated in articles 
on national regional autonomy in the 1982 PRC Constitution27 and in the 
Law on Regional National Autonomy (“LRNA”) passed in 1984, as revised in 
2001.28 Article 4 of  the PRC Constitution provides that, “Regional autonomy 
is practiced in areas where people of  minority nationalities live in concentrated 
communities.”  Article 15 of  the LRNA provides that autonomous areas carry 
out their role “under the unified leadership of  the State Council and shall 
be subordinate to it.” The LRNA expressly promises protection for national 
minority autonomy in the areas of  language, education, political representation, 
administrative appointments, local economic and financial policies, and the 
use of  local natural resources. How effectively minorities can exercise such 
promised autonomy is, however, debatable. As discussed below, these laws have 
been rigidly applied and serve as the basis for substantial intrusions of  central 
control and the national political system into local affairs. They contrast 
dramatically with the broad and flexible autonomy provision applied in Hong 
Kong under Article 31 of  the PRC Constitution.29
The 1982 PRC Constitution passed during China’s liberalizing phase 
appears to be aimed at allowing an enhanced degree of  local control. It includes 
the power, subject to higher approval, to enact “regulations on the exercise 
of  autonomy (zizhi tiaoli) and other separate regulations (danxing tiaoli) in 
tibet.net/en/index.php?id=115&rmenuid=11 (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
24. Michael C. Davis, Tibet, max Planck encycloPedIa oF PuB. Int’l law, http://www.mpepil.com/
sample_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e1364&recno=25& (last visited Jan. 
18, 2011). 
25. taBulatIon on natIonalItIes oF 2000 PoPulatIon census oF chIna (2003).
26. See June T. Dreyer, Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s Republic of China, 
in contemPorary tIBet: PolItIcs, deVeloPment and socIety In a dIsPuted reGIon 129, 131 
(Barry Sautman & June T. Dreyer, eds., 2006); anne-marIe Blondeau & katIa BuFFetrIlle, 
authentIcatInG tIBet, answers to chIna’s 100 QuestIons 144-151 (2008).
27. P.r.c. const. 1982, arts. 4, 59, 65, 89 & 112-122, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm.
28. P.R.C. Law on Regional National Autonomy, 1984 (“LRNA”).
29. Article 31, which aimed at China’s recovery of Hong Kong, Macau and possibly Taiwan, 
provides for the creation of Special Administrative Regions, which are to be given a high 
degree of autonomy.
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light of  the political, economic and cultural characteristics.”30 The LRNA, 
with the same language, specifies the need for approval of  all autonomy and 
special regulations from the next higher level of  government.31 “Regulations 
on the exercise of  autonomy” have the status of  a sub-constitution or basic 
law. It is typically expected that only one such regulation will be enacted in 
each autonomous area.32 For autonomous regions such approval must come 
directly from the Central Government, while for lesser autonomous areas at 
the prefecture and county levels such approval must come from the higher 
provincial government. The PRC’s five autonomous regions include Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia. None of  these regions 
have received approval for such basic regulation on the exercise of  autonomy. 
The one attempt at enacting a basic regulation on the exercise of  autonomy 
in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) went through 15 drafts and was 
eventually abandoned.33 Lesser autonomous areas at the prefecture and county 
level have received approval from provincial governments for the above noted 
regulations on the exercise of  autonomy that largely track the LRNA content. 
Autonomous regions and areas have enacted many “separate regulations,” 
the second category specified in the authorizing provisions.34 A third category 
would be ordinary laws unrelated to autonomy, which do not require such 
higher approval.35
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over the legislative drafting 
processes in autonomous areas is an even more daunting challenge to autonomy 
than the legislative approval process, involving oversight and approval at every 
step in the legislative drafting process. This leaves very little legislative discretion 
for local “autonomous” communities. Chunli Xia describes a complex system 
of  CCP oversight of  the legislative drafting process: first, the Party Committee 
of  the Local People’s Congress (LPC) sets up a legislative group made up of  
people from the LPC Party Committee, the LPC Standing Committee and 
the local government; second, a draft is circulated and submitted by the LPC 
Standing Committee to the Party Committee of  the autonomous area; third, 
after approval by the Party Committee of  the autonomous area it is then 
submitted to a higher party committee for further review; fourth, when the 
Party Committee of  the autonomous area receives approval it submits the 
draft to the LPC Standing Committee Party Committee to be submitted to the 
30. P.r.c. const., supra note 27, art.116.
31. LRNA art. 19. 
32. Id.
33. Yash Ghai, et al., Is there Space for ‘Genuine Autonomy’ for the Tibetan Areas in the PRC’s 
System of Nationalities Regional Autonomy? 17 Int’l J. mIn. & GP. rts. 137, 175-78 (2010).   
34. Separate regulations are regulations made by autonomous legislative bodies on specific 
topics such as Language, marriage, family planning, etc.
35. Chun Li Xia, Autonomous Legislative Power in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People’s 
Republic of China: The Law and the Reality, in one country, two systems, three leGal 
orders—PersPectIVes on eVolutIon: essays on macau’s autonomy aFter the resumPtIon oF 
soVereIGnty By chIna 541, 551 (Jorge C. Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds., 2009) (quoting the 
Organic Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 7 and the Legislative Law, art. 63). 
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LPC for passage.36 Given the center’s control over the CCP and the fact that 
party officials from the center have always occupied top local party positions, 
there is little room for local legislative initiative.37 
To such legal impediments the national minority policy adds structural and 
conceptual impediments. First, the replication of  the national political structures 
in minority areas, disallowing distinct indigenous forms of  government, 
renders such areas especially susceptible to top-down central administrative 
control.38 The distinctive indigenous form of  government promised in the 
1951 Seventeen-point Agreement surrendering to Chinese control of  Tibet 
was ultimately not delivered. Today only Hong Kong and Macau possess such 
distinctive local self-rule, as provided by Article 31 of  the PRC Constitution 
relating to special administrative regions. 
Second, Marxist ideology seems to contradict the purported character of  
China’s policies in Tibet.  The Marxist doctrine would identify the 1950s 
occupation of  Tibet as “liberation” and the institution of  CCP rule in 
Tibet as “democratic reform.” This is because, according to Marxist logic, 
colonialism is a product of  capitalist exploitation and does not arise in a non-
capitalist environment.39 Since China never reached the stage of  full capitalist 
development it could not be said to have colonized Tibet. The exploited classes 
of  Tibet were to be joined, under a Chinese “internal multinational system,” in 
a “common program” of  local autonomous rule.40 Any autonomy regime was 
merely a temporary solution on the path to ultimate assimilation of  minority 
nationalities.41 Statements to the contrary, such as the 17-point agreement (which 
purports to be aimed at acceding way to greater local control/autonomy), from 
the Marxist point of  view would be only temporary. The 17-point agreement 
promised that “Central Authorities would not alter the existing political system 
in Tibet.”42 But, as the subsequent record of  pervasive CCP intrusion suggests, 
it clearly envisioned that the “liberated” Tibetans would seek “reform” and ask 
for the CCP’s vision of  minority autonomy. Such a system was in fact imposed 
after the 1959 uprising when the Dalai Lama fled.
Especially after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, all forms of  traditional political 
structure were progressively eliminated. This purging of  traditional political 
36. Id. at 545-47. Xia notes that this process has been followed rather closely since the 2001 
revisions of the LRNA. 
37. See Blondeau & BuFFetrIlle, supra note 26, at 191-196.
38. Such replication, as specified in the PRC Constitution and evident in CCP practice, essentially 
involves a system of Peoples’ Congresses to rule at the local levels and national level. Likewise, 
CCP control prevails at all levels of government. While the details of how this system operates, 
is beyond the scope of this article, it suffices to say that replicating this system precludes the 
maintenance of indigenous forms of government in autonomous areas.
39. smIth, supra note 21, at 233; White Paper, supra note 22.
40. Common Program of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Committee (1949). 
41. smIth, supra note 21, at 233. Chinese officials cite advanced technology and modern 
communications to justify a more direct form of rule. 
42. Id.
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forms was especially radical during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
which was a period of  hard-line class struggle and massive cultural destruction 
across China. In the early 1980s after the Cultural Revolution, when Chinese 
Premier Hu Yaobang observed especially dire conditions in Tibet, a somewhat 
remorseful China pursued a brief  period of  liberalization. This was however, 
followed by greater repression and even martial law later that decade, as 
Tibetans became more outspoken in the slightly more liberal environment. 
Policies restricting the use of  Han cadres in Tibet in the early 1980s were soon 
abandoned by the end of  the decade. In the last recent decade, a policy of  
cracking down on political support for the exiled Dalai Lama and so-called 
patriotic education has been combined with greater emphasis on economic 
development under which Chinese immigration has been favored.43 Massive 
Chinese economic investment in Tibet has been perceived by Tibetans as a 
form of  colonization, which benefits the Chinese much more than the Tibetans. 
Over the years Chinese repression has included military occupation and 
crackdowns, the sacking and razing of  Buddhist monasteries during the 
Cultural Revolution, suppression of  religion, coerced “reeducation” of  monks 
and nuns in monasteries, imprisonment of  dissidents, and the forced relocation 
of  rural dwellers and herders to more populated areas.44 Monks and nuns have 
been coerced into renouncing the Dalai Lama.45 Popular dissent and rebellion 
famously arose in 1959, 1989 and 2008. Resistance by monks and nuns and 
others frequently occurs, as monks and nuns in the monasteries resist attempts 
at “patriotic education” and Chinese attempts to control religious doctrines 
and decisions.46 
The question then is, which side is correct? Studies and reports have appeared 
on both sides of  this debate. On the Chinese side, the May 2004 official White 
Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet highlights favorable statistics on 
Tibetan participation in autonomous governance, including very favourable 
data on Tibetan participation in the local people’s congresses and local 
government; a 93 percent voter turnout rate for county level elections; Tibetan 
and other ethnic minority deputies in excess of  80 percent at both the regional 
and city levels; and a claim of  generally over 80 percent Tibetan occupation 
43.  Warren W. Smith, China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy 33-34 (East-West Center Washington 
Working Papers, Paper No. 2, October 2004), available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/
fileadmin/stored/pdfs/EWCWwp002.pdf. 
44.  See generally Blondeau & BuFFetrIlle, supra note 26, at 144-151.
45. Interview with President, Gu Chu Sun Movement of Tibet (Association of former Political 
Prisoners), in Dharamsala, India (Aug. 3, 2006); Interview of “Singing Nun” Renchen Choeky, 
Dharamsala, India (Aug. 4, 2006) (After refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama in reeducation 
meetings in their nunnery, the Singing Nun was sentenced to prison for demonstrating in 
protest in Lhasa; and sentenced again while in prison when 18 nuns produced a singing 
recording that was smuggled out)
46. Id.; See also China: Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension (Minority Rights Grp. 
Int’l & Hum. Rts. in China, 2007), available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-
HRIC.China.Report.pdf (“HRIC Report”).
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of  the top positions of  various autonomous governments and standing 
committees.47 It states that at the time of  the report 12 of  the 19 deputies 
from the TAR to the National People’s Congress were Tibetan;48 that the 
Tibetan language is taught in the schools and widely used along with Chinese 
language—(though critics worry this is mostly at the primary level49). Even that 
has come under threat, with recent reports of  Tibetan demonstrations against 
reported Chinese efforts in Qinghai autonomous areas to replace Tibetan 
with Chinese as the primary language of  instruction in primary schools.50 The 
report also emphasizes China’s contribution to Tibet’s economic development51 
(though critics worry that these policies benefit Chinese more than Tibetans52). 
On the other hand, outside reports (which may be less partisan than national 
Chinese reports) highlight statistics that tend to demonstrate a lack of  local 
autonomy in areas where it is most required. A 1997 report of  the International 
Commission of  Jurist (“ICJ”) notes that while “Tibetans are in positions of  
nominal authority, they are often shadowed by more powerful Chinese officials” 
and that “every local organ is shadowed by a CCP committee or ‘leading 
group.’”53 A 2007 report by the Minority Rights Group International and 
Human Rights in China further highlights several deficiencies, including the 
centralization of  power in the top leadership of  the CCP; the aforementioned 
concerns regarding the law-making process, Chinese dominance of  CCP 
leadership in minority areas, and the lack of  real power at the local level.54 Of  
particular concern for the deeply religious Tibetan nationality, is a CCP rule 
that bars party members from practicing Tibetan Buddhism and a recently 
added rule that cadres withdraw their kids from Tibetan schools in India.55
III. seekIng a solutIon In InternatIonal practIce  
China has made great efforts to justify its Tibet policies on the basis of  
international law and practice, arguing that its 1951 “liberation” was justified by 
an international law claim of  historical title; that its current policies and claims 
to defeat Tibetan rights of  self-determination are protected by sovereignty; 
47. White Paper, supra note 22.
48. Id. 
49. See Blondeau & BuFFetrIlle, supra note 26, at 235.
50.  Edward Wong, Tibetans in China Protest Proposed Curbs on Their Language, n.y. tImes, 
Oct. 22, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/asia/23china.
html?_r=1.
51. White Paper, supra note 22.
52. See Blondeau & BuFFetrIlle, supra note 26, at 250-277. (Comments by Andrew M. Fischer. 
Fischer worries that the current policy of large public subsidies tends to benefit Chinese 
officials and large Chinese construction companies, while creating dependency and the need 
for more subsidies for Tibet—what he calls the ‘boomerang effect’. He sees greater agriculture 
productivity if Tibetans are left alone in the traditional mixed system of herding and farming.)
53. tIBet: human rIGhts and the rule oF law 14-21 (1997).
54. See HRIC Report, supra note 46.
55. Ghai et al., supra note 33, at 21.
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that its autonomy policy is an internal affair both as a general proposition and 
as a matter of  indigenous rights. However the legality and justification of  all 
three claims is debatable. Perhaps more convincing to most foreign ministries 
has been China’s forceful maintenance of  effective control over Tibet for more 
than five decades, garnering formal international recognition of  its claims. 
The uncertain status of  both autonomy and indigenous rights in international 
law may also be a factor encouraging reluctance to directly challenge China’s 
policies. Questionable Chinese human rights practices and autonomy policies 
have, nevertheless, attracted considerable disapproval and criticism. Let us 
examine the veracity and legality of  the Chinese claims. 
The historical narrative offers little support for China’s claim to historical 
title. Similar to Korea, Tibet appears to have been at most a vassal state in an 
imperial system during limited periods of  the Yuan and Qing dynasties.56 The 
foreign Mongols who later established the Chinese Yuan Dynasty (1270-1368) 
actually accepted the submission of  and eventually conquered Tibet from 
1247AD before they conquered China and always operated Tibet as a separate 
part of  their empire.57 Warren Smith describes a rather carefully calibrated 
diplomatic relationship from the Yuan Dynasty forward between China’s 
emperors and Tibetan lamas. Imperial attempts at subordination would meet 
Tibetan resistance.58 During the Yuan Dynasty leading Tibetan lamas served 
in a religious advisory role for the Mongol emperors—a role characterized by 
the Tibetans as a Cho-yon or patron-priest relationship.59 This state of  affairs 
receded somewhat in the succeeding Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), 
when Tibetan lamas were of  Chinese imperial interest mostly as intermediaries 
with the still-threatening Mongols.60 The succeeding Manchu-dominated 
Qing Dynasty (1636-1910) featured the highest level of  Chinese intervention, 
which in the 18th century sometimes involved occupation of  Tibet by imperial 
forces.61 Though Qing control reached its zenith in the late 18th century, it 
always involved some form of  indirect imperial rule, which classified Tibet 
under the Qing’s “exterior empire,” though the Eastern Tibetan provinces of  
Kham and Amdo were sometimes subject to direct Qing control.62  By the late 
19th century, the declining Qing began to loose its grip on Tibet. 
56. Eliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics 28-30 (East-West Center 
Washington, Policies Studies No. 7, 2004), available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/
fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS007.pdf.  (A vassel state in this context would be a loosely affiliated 
state that was not fully incorporated into the Chinese empire. Sperling points out that the 
Chinese need to recast Tibet as an historically internal part of China in order to justify 
occupation came up only under CCP rule.) 
57. See generally warren w. smIth, tIBetan natIon: a hIstory oF tIBetan natIonalIsm and sIno-
tIBetan relatIons 83-100 (1996).
58. Id. 
59. Sperling, supra note 56, at 30-31.
60. smIth, supra note 57, at 103-7.
61. Id. at 111-112.
62. Id.  at 121, 134-138, 145, 151.
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From 1911 until the PRC invasion in 1950, Tibet enjoyed de facto 
independence.63 To further justify their “liberation” of  Tibet, Chinese officials 
depict Tibet during this period as feudal and savage. One may wonder whether 
Tibet was any worse off  than the other feudal regimes that surrounded it in 
this period.64 Nascent forms of  constitutional government, involving a cabinet 
and limited forms of  legislative representation had been established during 
the late Qing.65 During the defacto independence in the early twentieth century 
these institutions were further developed. Telling facts often ignored in this 
dispute are that the Tibetans largely maintained a separate language, culture 
and governance until their occupation in the 1950s and were never subject to 
outside direct rule.66 The exile government has persisted to develop nascent 
constitutionalism, establishing a democratic constitutional system in exile, as 
they have also proposed to the Chinese government for any resumed autonomy 
regime.67
It was also during the period of  de facto independence in the early twentieth 
century that the language of  statehood and sovereignty was first adopted in 
negotiations between Tibet, China and British India.68 While Republican 
Chinese officials claimed Tibet as their own, they generally acknowledged that 
Tibet had a special status with only Chinese indirect rule.69 In negotiations 
at Simla, India in 1913, the British proposed a notion, similar to that China 
had agreed for Mongolia, of  inner and outer Tibet.70 This included a largely 
independent central Tibet under Chinese suzerainty with a subordinate 
Eastern Tibet under Chinese sovereignty.71 In negotiations, both at Simla 
and later in the 1930s, Republican China acknowledged Tibet’s high degree 
of  autonomy under nominal Chinese rule.72 All parties actually initialed the 
Simla Convention accepting this view, though the Chinese ultimately did not 
ratify it.73 They were dissatisfied with the stipulated boundary between inner 
and outer Tibet.74 
When the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Tibet in 1951, 
the Dalai Lama faced an offer he could not refuse,75 embodied in a 17-point 
Agreement on “measures for the peaceful liberation of  Tibet.”76 The PRC 
63. melVyn c. GoldsteIn, a hIstory oF modern tIBet: 1913-1951 763 (1989).
64. White Paper, supra note 22; See also Blondeau & BuFFetrIlle, supra note 26, at 81-84.
65. GoldsteIn, supra note 63, at 10-31.
66. See generally smIth, supra note 57.
67. See generally Lobsang Sangay, Tibet: Exiles’ Journey, 14 Journal oF democracy 119 (2003).
68. GoldsteIn, supra note 63, at 68-80, 832-841.
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id.
74. Id. 
75. dalaI lama, Freedom In exIle: the autoBIoGraPhy oF the dalaI lama 64 (1991); GoldsteIn, supra 
note 63, at 798-803.
76. Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on 
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claimed to “liberate” Tibet, presumably from foreign influences such as British 
India.77 The 17-point agreement, the only treaty the PRC entered with one 
of  its national minorities, still acknowledged the special status of  Tibet and 
promised indirect rule.78 When China failed to honour these commitments, a 
state of  popular rebellion ensued and the Dalai Lama fled to India on March 
28, 1959, bringing to an end centuries of  Tibetan self-rule.79 In September 
1965 the TAR was proclaimed under the first People’s Congress of  the TAR.80
Vassal state status, thus offers little justification for China’s current claim 
of  historical title over this very distinctive and well-established national 
community. This explains why Chinese representatives have pushed the Dalai 
Lama to accept Chinese historical interpretations and why he has refused.81 In 
this particular case such historical title claims are particularly weak, given their 
lack of  empirical foundation and the fact that they appeared to end completely 
with the collapse of  the Qing imperial dynasty. Added to these difficulties 
associated with China’s imperial past, is the general weakness of  historical title 
as an international legal basis for sovereign claims. In the Western Sahara case, 
the ICJ judged such claims as an insufficient basis for claiming territory held 
by neighboring national groups.82 
The second tactic employed by China is to emphasize its right to sovereignty 
to defeat any Tibetan claims of  self-determination or outside interference. 
Refuting China’s current sovereignty claims, which are supported by actual 
control and the recognition of  most other states, may pose a more difficult 
challenge to China’s critics. Tibetans have lived with six decades of  Chinese 
occupation and direct rule. The Chinese see the retention of  Tibet as a matter 
of  vital national interest and have worked aggressively to gain international 
acceptance of  this fiat accompli. Fiat accompli and real politic have combined to 
leave Tibetans with little hope of  independence.83 Under such circumstances 
Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951 (“17-point Agreement”). See also 
GoldsteIn, supra note 63, at 759-772.
77. GoldsteIn, supra note 63, at 759-772.
78. 17-point Agreement, supra note 76.
79. Dalai Lama, supra note 46, at 136. 
80. Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (PCTAR), Established in April 
1956.
81. See Sperling, supra note 56.
82. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct.16).
83. While mere occupation does not by itself, justify sovereign claims, when that occupation 
is by a major power with local acceptance (albeit under duress) and is accompanied by 
expressed recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet by the many states that recognize 
China, the obstacles to any attempt to seek independence are formidable. Further, the 
recent ICJ  advisory opinion regarding Kosovo, which confirmed the legality of a mere 
declaration of independence would appear to offer little practical solace to Tibet’s claims 
(unless circumstances change radically), given China’s strong position and the court’s 
deferral to political recognition as an indication of actual independence. See Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion (Jul. 22, 2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=
3&p2=4&code=kos&case=141&k=21 (“Kosovo opinion”).
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is there a strong argument for a heightened security in international law for 
internal self-determination and autonomy? 
Self-determination is grounded in the UN Charter. International law generally 
distinguishes between external and internal rights of  self-determination.84 The 
external right of  self-determination is considered to include a right of  secession.85 
The internal right is concerned with minority rights of  self-governance within a 
sovereign state. Common article (1) of  both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) provides “all peoples” with the right to 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural rights.” But these clauses offer little guidance on who such peoples 
are and how the right is to be exercised.86 
There has been only a few instances where this issue has been discussed at 
the international level, so as to shed light on this issue. In Reference re Secession 
of  Quebec, the Supreme Court of  Canada concluded, “The international law 
right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external self-
determination in situations of  former colonies; where a people is oppressed, 
as for example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group 
is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, 
social or cultural development.”87 One could argue that Tibet satisfies both 
of  these criteria. Given the previous analysis of  China’s historical title claim, 
there is a reasonable argument that China in effect colonized Tibet in the 
guise of  liberation and further that Tibetans, under the system of  governance 
described in the previous section lack meaningful access to government. Three 
UN General Assembly resolutions passed in 1959, 1961 and 1965 appeared 
to say as much on the latter point.88 While the three UN resolutions did not 
contest Chinese sovereignty and demand withdrawal, they did condemn 
China severely for human rights violations and effective denial of  internal self-
determination. Unfortunately, the practical recognition of  China’s claims by 
Tibetans in the 17-Point Agreement and by countries that have recognized 
China leaves little practical possibility for achieving external autonomy, as the 
Dalai Lama has generally acknowledged. Further, It is doubtful whether the 
84. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) (“Independence Declaration”); Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“Friendly Relations 
Declaration”).
85. See Independence Declaration, supra note 86.
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“ICCPR”); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(“ICESCR”).
87. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 161 DLR 385, ¶135 (Can.).
88. For a discussion of the three UNGA Resolutions condemning China’s human rights record in 
Tibet (1959, 1961, 1965), see smIth, supra note 57, at 492-532.
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recent Kosovo advisory opinion recognizing a right to declare independence, 
subject ultimately to political decisions regarding recognition, would be of  
much assistance toward gaining recognition of  independence for Tibet under 
present circumstances.89
In respect of  the third alternative argument, for autonomy, guarantees 
of  internal autonomy have generally not been well secured by international 
law.90 It may be argued, however, that in two circumstances internal autonomy 
rights gain a degree of  international recognition: 1) when such rights are the 
consequence of  treaty arrangements transferring or surrendering sovereignty, 
the treaty itself  embodies such international recognition (such as the situation 
of  Hong Kong) or 2) when it arises out of  the denial of  rights of  self-
determination to indigenous peoples.91 The Tibet case arguably implicates both 
situations. The 17-point agreement arguably reflects a treaty arrangement if  
one accepts, as Tibetans have claimed, that the de facto independence of  Tibet 
before 1950 effectively established it as a state at the time of  the agreement. An 
alternative route is offered by recognition of  the indigenous status of  Tibetans, 
which, as best articulated by the Indigenous People’s Declaration, would 
require adherence to all agreements previously entered with the indigenous 
population.92 
Evolving standards of  human rights, self-determination and autonomy have 
now gained greater international traction in the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of  Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration provides a comprehensive 
account of  established international standards for the protection of  indigenous 
populations, including the substantive content of  internal autonomy.93 While 
UN declarations are considered soft law and not legally binding, declarations 
passed with unanimity or ones that purport to declare existing customary law 
may be taken as binding customary law.94 The Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration 
enjoyed nearly unanimous passage, 143 to 4 with 11 abstentions,95 and can 
thus be seen to embody in its text some appearance of  existing customary law 
89. See, Kosovo opinion, supra note 83. 
90. See generally D. Sanders, Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law? 55 nordIc J. Int’l 
l. 17 (1986); F. L. Kirgis, The Degrees of Self-determination in the UN Era, 88 am. J. Int’l 
l. 310 (1994); Hans-Joachim Heintze, Evolution of Autonomy and Federalism, in Jorge C. 
Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal, supra note 35, at 389-408. 
91. See UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration”).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The International Court of Justice has consistently used the voting patterns of states in 
respect of a particular resolution to assess the customary nature of the declaration. For 
instance, in the Nicaragua case, the Declaration on Friendly Relations between States, was 
considered by the court to be reflective of custom. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nic. V. U.S.), 1986 ICJ 14, ¶188 (Jun. 27).
95. The only four states opposing the Declaration were the United States, Canada, New Zealand 
and Australia. The eleven abstaining were Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, 
Columbia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine.
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surrounding the UN Charter and international human rights treaties.96 The 
Chinese government voted for the declaration both in the UN Human Rights 
Council and the UN General Assembly. Unfortunately, China maintains the 
position that there are no indigenous peoples in China,97 claiming 5000 years 
of  national unity and harmony with minorities living on their own lands.98 
Given Tibet’s unique status, as recognized in the 17-point agreement, there is 
room for considerable doubt concerning this claim as to Tibet. 
While the UN Declaration does not define “indigenous peoples,” it does 
specify that such indigenous communities exist throughout the world and are 
not confined to former victims of  European colonialism in the Americas.99 A 
separate 1986 UN study defined indigenous peoples as “communities, …which, 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors 
of  the societies now prevailing....”100 It also emphasized that such communities 
consider themselves distinct from the dominant sector.101 The Tibetan people 
clearly satisfy these criteria. They were forcefully invaded in 1950, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of  society, form a present non-dominant 
sector of  society and seem determined to preserve their ethnic identity.102 Thus, 
whatever its legal status, this declaration can clearly serve as a useful guide for 
the treatment of  indigenous or similarly situated peoples. 
The Declaration offers an overview of  what such internal autonomy should 
include. It’s preamble emphasizes demilitarization of  indigenous lands; the 
right of  indigenous people to freely determine their relationship with states; 
that treaties, agreements and constructive arrangements with states are 
matters of  international concern; “the fundamental importance of  the right 
of  self-determination of  all peoples, by virtue of  which they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”; and that the right to exercise self-determination in conformity 
96. The opening preliminary phrase added to the draft in its final stage before passage indicates 
that the General Assembly was, “Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations, and good faith in the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by States in 
accordance with the Charter.” See Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration, supra note 91, Preamble.
97. China Concerned with Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Apr. 1, 1997, http://
ch.China-embassy.org/eng/ztnr/rqwt/t138829.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
98. Id. 
99. A 1986 UN study of indigenous populations included several Asian countries in the study: 
Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Philippines and Sri Lanka. See Jose 
Martinez Coho, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations 
(Final Report to UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, Sept.13, 2007), UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8. (“UN Working Group 
Report”) 
 There are thought to be over 370 million indigenous people worldwide. See UN adopts 
declaration on rights for indigenous peoples worldwide, Int’l herald trIB., Sept. 13, 2007.
100. UN Working Group Report, supra note 99, at 4.
101. Id. 
102. Tibetan Memorandum, supra note 10.  
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with international law shall not be denied.103 China’s weak commitment to 
these ideals is evident in its practices under its national minority laws discussed 
earlier,104 and its tendency towards militarization of  the Tibetan plateau.105 
The operative articles of  the Declaration guarantee to indigenous peoples 
the right of  self-determination;106 the right to autonomy or self-government 
in matters relating to their internal and local affairs;107 the right to manifest, 
practice, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs 
and ceremonies, including access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites 
and control of  their ceremonial objects;108 the right to participate in decision-
making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures;109 the right to 
be consulted and prior consent through their own representative institutions 
before implementing state legislative and administrative measures;110 and the 
right to recognition, observance and enforcement of  treaties, agreements and 
other constructive arrangements111. At the same time they are guaranteed the 
rights protected by the various human rights treaties and covenants. China’s 
treatment of  Tibetan people under its national minority laws clearly falls 
considerably short of  these requirements.112 
The situation in Tibet appears to rather easily satisfy the requirements 
for international recognition of  the Tibetan right to autonomy. First, China 
committed itself  to provide autonomy in its 17-point agreement. Further, it 
appears to many researchers that Tibet was already effectively an independent 
state in the early twentieth century when this agreement was struck under the 
duress of  the Chinese occupation. Even if  this so-called “de facto independence” 
is not recognized, then the second route to the right to autonomy is clearly 
established. That Tibetans are an indigenous population seems empirically 
true by virtue of  the available criteria discussed above. Their distinctiveness, 
separate language, distinct culture and subordination to a dominant population 
all point to this reality. Under the declaration that China voted for, they would 
clearly be entitled to autonomy and self-governance guarantees. That both 
cases are relatively strong at a minimum points to the justification for other 
countries, including India, to take an interest in this issue. Practically, however 
103. See Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration, supra note 91, Preamble.
104. See supra notes 27-55, and accompanying text.
105. Minnie Chan & Shaikh A. Rahman, PLA live-fire drills warning to India on borders: experts, 
south chIna mornInG Post, Nov. 2, 2010 at A6.
106. Indigenous People’s Declaration, supra note 91, art.  3.
107. Id. art. 4.
108. Id. art. 12.
109. Id. art. 18.
110. Id. art. 19.
111. Id. art. 37.
112. See supra note 27-55, and accompanying text, for a reflection on China’s willingness to really 
consult with indigenous representatives and the many specific shortcomings in how Tibetans 
are permitted to participate in their own governance. 
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China wants to characterize the Tibetan people, it is clear that a responsible 
approach would be to adhere to the Indigenous Declaration that it had earlier 
supported. This would not only slow the flow of  refugees into India but would 
also open the door to a more fruitful Sino-Tibetan relationship.
conclusIon: the solutIon--achIeVIng autonomy 
under the chInese constItutIon
China faces a choice between continuing to pursue its existing Tibet policy 
with its tendency to maintain a now 60-year festering sore on the Sino-Indian 
border or considering a more open-ended flexible approach. I would suggest a 
hybrid approach combining its national minority laws and the approach under 
Article 31 of  the PRC Constitution, as proposed in the Tibetan Memorandum. 
The current hard-line approach aiming at assimilation has not shown such 
flexibility and has created a very contentious situation. Article 31 provides, 
“The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The 
systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed 
by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in light of  the specific 
conditions.” This flexible approach, now employed in Hong Kong and Macau, 
in some hybrid form would certainly be welcomed by the Tibetan side and 
fit under the frame of  China’s constitution. The Tibetan memorandum says 
as much by offering, in the spirit of  compromise, a hybrid that would fully 
implement the current national minority laws with some Article 31 ingredients 
as security for the arrangement.
Unfortunately, the 2004 Chinese white paper on Tibet expressly rejected the 
Article 31 approach. China sought to distinguish Tibet from Hong Kong, citing 
a lack of  “imperialist aggression” and contestation over “effective sovereignty”:
“The situation in Tibet is entirely different from that in Hong Kong and 
Macao. The Hong Kong and Macao issue was a product of  imperialist 
aggression against China; it was an issue of  China’s resumption of  exercise 
of  its sovereignty. Since Ancient times Tibet has been an inseparable part of  
Chinese territory, where the Central Government has always exercised effective 
sovereign jurisdiction over the region. So the issue of  resuming exercise of  
sovereignty does not exist. With the peaceful liberation of  Tibet in 1951, Tibet 
had fundamentally extricated itself  from the fetters of  imperialism. Later, 
through the Democratic Reform, the abolition of  the feudal serfdom under 
theocracy and the establishment of  the Tibet Autonomous Region, the socialist 
system has been steadily consolidated…So the possibility of  implementing 
another social system does not exist either...Any act aimed at undermining 
and changing the regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet is in violation of  the 
Constitution and law…”113
113. White Paper, supra note 22.
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The questionable claims about ancient inseparability, liberation and socialist 
consolidation clearly cast doubt on Chinese policies.
Because of  this statement, Tibetan negotiators have put their case under 
PRC Constitution Article 4 and national minority laws, arguing that the 
Chinese have not fulfilled their own expressed commitments. While China has 
promised local autonomy and a flexible approach tailored to specific minority 
interests,114 it has imposed a rigid top-down approach.115 Chinese officials have 
rejected the Tibetan middle way approach most recently reflected in the Tibetan 
Memorandum, arguing that the “middle way” approach is “tantamount to not 
recognizing the Central Government, not recognizing ethnic autonomy, and 
not recognizing the socialist system.”116 It seems that China will enter serious 
discussions with the Tibetan side only if  the Tibetans admit there is nothing 
to discuss.117 
A policy that genuinely respects Tibetan autonomy and treasures Tibet as 
a valued national constituent of  the Chinese multinational state may offer a 
more appropriate path to resolution of  this issue. The current Dalai Lama 
could be a reliable and efficacious partner in resolving these issues. While 
India has no direct control over Chinese policy, by hosting the Dalai Lama and 
his fellow exiles India plays a role in preserving Tibetan claims until a more 
agreeable solution can be found. Beyond this important historical role, India 
can be a voice to encourage a reasonable approach, perhaps using the Tibetan 
Memorandum as a discussion text going forward.
114. This promise was originally made in the 17-point Agreement and is currently made under the 
NLRA laws. See supra notes 27-55, and accompanying text. 
115. Interview with Kalon Tripa, Chair of the Kashag or elected Prime Minister Samdhong 
Rinpoche, Dharamsala, India (Aug. 3, 2006). 
116. Author’s interview with Liu Hongji, Tibetology Research Centre, Beijing, China (Aug. 25, 
2006). 
117. See smIth, supra note 57, at 256.
